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1 Introduction 
 
This UKERC working paper has been prompted by an inquiry LQWR¶ORZFDUERQQHWZRUNV·
launched in September 2015 by the House of Commons Select Committee on Energy 
and Climate Change1. A response on behalf of UKERC has been submitted to the 
Committee. The present paper expands on many of themes included in that response 
and provides more detail and discussion. 
 
$QH[LVWLQJHOHFWULFLW\V\VWHP·VLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLVGHVLJQHGWRPHHWFRQVXPHUV·GHPDQG
for power when that demand occurs. The annual peak demand for power is fundamental 
in dimensioning the total generation capacity that converts energy from different 
sources into power. Different fuels are available in different places. Although many of 
the fuels can be moved, they are moved at a cost that should be compared with that of 
transferring the energy once it has been converted into electricity. Hydro, wind and solar 
power can most cost-effectively be utilised in particular places. These factors lead to the 
construction of power networks to transfer power from generators to the electrical loads 
that consumers use to fulfil particular energy service needs. 
 
The demand for power varies in time ² for example, it tends to be highest during the 
day or, in winter, early evening ² and in space. However, the power available from 
generators also varies not only because the wind does not always blow or the sun shine. 
Generating units, including very large ones, can suffer faults and need to be taken 
offline from time to time for maintenance. These variations mean that the available 
generation and demand are not always balanced. The system can be rebalanced by 
making use of storage, which does not mean solely by means that can convert both to 
and from electricity. For example, gas, coal or water can be stored and, given enough 
notice to start up the generating plant, used to generate electricity when required. 
Alternatively, in principle, the timing of demand for electricity can be changed so it 
matches the moments at which generation is available. (This already happens, though 
not yet to any great extent). Alternatively, imbalances can be matched in space. That is, 
given enough network capacity connecting two areas, a surplus of available power 
relative to demand in one area can be shared with another that has a deficit, and vice 
versa. This allows a sharing of reserve generation capacity between different areas, 
reducing the total reserve required and supporting security of supply, and was the 
original motivation for the development of the national grid in Britain in the 1930s to 
1960s. However, since the 1960s it has been recognised as also facilitating the use of 
                                               
1 See http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/energy-
and-climate-change-committee/inquiries/  
the cheapest generation resources, something that would now be described as 
facilitating competition in the electricity market. 
 
In respect of the renewable resources that, in recent years, have been developed most 
rapidly in Britain ² wind and solar ² the primary energy source cannot be stored. 
However, it is also the case that storage of the energy released through nuclear fission 
is difficult or costly (this is what the original pumped storage stations were mostly 
motivated by), and frequent upward or downward regulation of the rate of fission must 
be carefully controlled and built, at a cost, into the design of nuclear power stations. 
Although we are yet to see it in Britain, power stations designed to burn fossil fuels and 
capture and store the CO2 emitted might also adjust their output but must be designed 
to do so, again at a cost. 
 
This paper discusses various issues associated with the development and operation of 
networks to facilitate and transfer energy derived from low carbon sources such as 
renewables, nuclear power and burning of fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage. 
It starts by briefly describing the limitations of present day networks before moving on 
to discuss the likely features of a network for low carbon energy and how it should be 
developed and operated, the facilitation of new connections to the network, the roles of 
the network licensees, the key technologies and the support of innovation and, before 
drawing some overall conclusions, some lessons that can be learned from other 
countries. 
2 What are the limitations of today's electricity 
infrastructure and how can these limitations 
be addressed?   
The power system that we have in Britain at present has been largely successful at 
meeting electricity needs at reasonable cost and reliability for many decades, but  it has 
finite capacity. It is now being challenged in a number of ways, some of them due to 
closure, for various reasons, of established generation capacity. In addition: 
 
1. the type of generation that has grown most in recent years and is expected to continue 
to grow significantly is intermittent renewables, in particular wind and solar PV, which 
have the following characteristics: 
a. many of the new generators are being connected at locations that have least 
network capacity, e.g. on the geographical periphery of the existing system such 
as in remote onshore locations or offshore, or on the electrical periphery, i.e.  
within the lowest  voltage parts of the distribution network; 
b. output of wind and solar PV is highly variable and somewhat uncertain which 
presents challenges for system balancing; 
c. operation of wind and solar power leads to a reduction in system inertia and, as 
a consequence, different system dynamic performance; 
2. many network as well as generation assets are reaching or have gone beyond their 
expected lives and, depending on future development of demand and generation, will 
need to be replaced; 
3. to meet overall energy decarbonisation targets there might be significant electrification 
of heat and transport and associated large increases in demand for electricity and flows 
on the network. 
Although the power system and network challenges associated with wind and solar 
power have been quite widely discussed, developments of new nuclear power stations 
present their own difficulties. For example, it is our understanding that the connections 
RI+LQNOH\3RLQW&DQG1X*HQ·VSURSRVHG0RRUVLGHVWDWLRQZRXOGERWKUHTXLUH
significant transmission reinforcements. In addition, without new nuclear stations 
having an ability to flex their output, their operation alongside intermittent renewables 
ZRXOGHQWDLOSHULRGVZKHQUHQHZDEOHV·RXWSXWPD\QHHGWREHFXUWDLOHG)LQDOO\D
system heavily dependent on nuclear power and intermittent renewables would make a 
¶EODFNVWDUW·RIWKHV\VWHPDIWHUDPDMRUXQUHOLDELOLW\HYHQWYHU\FKDOOHQJLQJ 
 
One particular issue associated with the connection of solar PV, most (if not all) of which 
is expected to be to the distribution networks, is that, at present, distribution is neither 
comprehensively monitored nor actively controlled.  
 
Possible means by which these limitations might be addressed are discussed in the next 
section. While these include network reinforcement at local, national and European 
scales, the level of reinforcement can be reduced by smarter system operation. 
3 What will a low carbon network look like, what 
are the challenges in achieving it, and what 
benefits will it bring?  
7KHQDWXUHRID¶ORZFDUERQQHWZRUN· 
$¶ORZFDUERQQHWZRUN·FDQEHXQGHUVWRRGWR be a network that permits the transfer of 
energy derived from low carbon sources to locations where it is used. There can actually 
be multiple low carbon networks, e.g. transferring water heated by energy from low 
carbon sources, or gases manufactured using low carbon energy, e.g. hydrogen or 
synthetic methane, and technologies such as micro combined heat and power promise 
efficiency benefits without totally eliminating carbon emissions. However, in this paper 
we will concentrate on electricity networks that form part of a low carbon electric power 
system. This is because, at present, this is the network that transfers most low carbon 
energy, and is the form of energy that is arguably the most flexible in respect of its use 
and options for production and, notwithstanding the attractions of, for example, a 
¶K\GURJHQHFRQRP\·LWDSSHDUVWRRIIHUWKHEHVWSURVSHFWVRIPHHWLQJWKHPDLQJRDOV
for a low carbon energy system that can be realised in the next 10-20 years: affordable, 
reliable and safe. However, as tLPHJRHVRQQRWOHDVWDV%ULWDLQ·VGHPDQGIRUKHDW
becomes progressively decarbonised, these other networks should not be neglected as 
they have a potentially very important part to play within a low carbon energy system. It 
should be ensured that all elements work successfully in concert with each other so that 
all aspects of energy need are met. 
 
The cost of decarbonising electricity while still providing an acceptable reliability of 
supply could be very high so a key measure of the success of a future low carbon power 
system will be that it minimises the cost of additional infrastructure. This can be 
achieved by maximising the utilisation of whatever infrastructure exists. This would also 
have the benefit of minimising the perceived intrusiveness of the power network, e.g. 
through reducing the need for additional overhead lines.  
¶&RUUHFWLYH·DQG¶SUHYHQWLYH·DFWLRQV 
$OWKRXJK¶FRUUHFWLYHDFWLRQV·RIRQHIRUPRUDQRWKHUKDYHEHHQDIHDWXUHRISRZHU
systems for many decades, it may be argued to increase the average utilisation of assets 
we need to make more extensive use of such actions and of flexibility of demand. The 
alternative to corrective actions ² ¶SUHYHQWLYHDFWLRQV·² recognises, on timescales from 
around a minute-ahead up to around a day-ahead, uncertainties associated with the 
level of demand and availability of generation and the possibility of unplanned and 
unavoidable changes such as a fault outage of a network branch or a generator. Often, 
the preventive action is to restrict outputs from certain generators or flows on the 
network simply to provide some margin for response to changes. This inevitably leaves 
some system capacity under-utilised. However, many of the changes might be 
manageable through good forecasting or else, often, simply do not occur.  
 
Instead of preventive actions, average network and low carbon generation utilisation can 
be increased by (a) being more precise about what the operating limits really are instead 
of using limits defined based on conservative assumptions; and (b) identifying actions 
that can be taken after a disturbance without restricting initial output from the cheapest 
generators2. 
 
                                               
2 In respect of short-run marginal costs, low carbon generators are the cheapest. 
  
Improved network monitoring 
The passage of current through electrical conductors causes them to heat up. One of the 
key operating limits of a power system is that conductors do not become too hot. 
Historically, thermal ratings have been assigned to each branch of the network to ensure 
that conductor or insulator temperatures are not excessive and system operators will 
limit the power flow if necessary, mainly through changes to the generation dispatch. 
However, real-time monitoring or, based on measured ambient conditions, estimation 
of actual conductor temperatures can allow more current to pass than conservatively set 
¶VWDWLF·UDWings would suggest, and so increase the utilisation of existing assets. Power 
transfers are also limited by system stability issues. New devices such as phasor 
measurement units (PMUs) promise to allow these limits to be calculated more precisely 
and so prRJUHVVLYHO\UHGXFHWKHVL]HRI¶VDIHW\PDUJLQV· 
0RUHH[WHQVLYHXVHRIFRUUHFWLYHDFWLRQVDQGWKH¶VPDUWJULG· 
Actions taken after a disturbance include automatically curtailing the output of 
generators operating in export-limited locations and quickly making use of reserve 
power elsewhere (provided it is available); or, where possible, reconfiguring the network 
to make use of whatever margin is available under the present condition. Given that the 
relevant technology is already installed on the system, the latter can be achieved by, for 
H[DPSOH¶SKDVHVKLIWLQJWUDQVIRUPHUV·WK\ULVWRUFRQWUROOHGVHULHVFRPSHQVDWLRQRU
embedded high voltage direct current (HVDC) connections such as the West Coast Link 
currently under construction between the South of Scotland and North-East Wales. 
HVDC makes use of power electronics and seems to offer particular attractions as it 
SURYLGHVWKHSRWHQWLDOIRULPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIQHZ¶VXSSOHPHQWDO·FRQWUROVWKDWLI
correctly designed, can contribute to management of dynamic responses of the system. 
Power electronics are also integral to solar PV and many wind turbines and, again, offer 
some degree of flexibility if appropriately designed. Their potential is also now being 
explored for use on the distribution networks. However, the relatively high resistance of 
the lowest voltage branches of distribution networks limit the effectiveness of various 
innovations at particular locations. 
 
It should be emphasised that the power system in Britain already makes extensive use of 
corrective actions, e.g. for management of system frequency or for ensuring that 
exports of power from Scotland to England remain stable. However, while the majority 
of reserve power in the past has taken the form of part-loaded or standby generation 
and contributes to meeting imbalances arising from higher than expected demand or 
lower than expected availability of generation, there is increasing recognition of the 
potential for flexible demand to contribute. That is, some users of electrical energy 
might be prepared to reduce their demand by delaying the service they gain from it to 
another time. For users that have some flexibility, they could be encouraged to use it by 
being offered recompense for adjustments or lower tariffs. Thus, particular consumers 
can especially benefit, but all consumers should benefit from lower total system costs. 
Such measures can be particularly effective when properly planned. For example, good 
forecasts of available renewable power can be used to inform users when would be the 
best time to use electricity or when a response margin should be made available and is 
most likely to be used. The potential for demand to be flexible depends on the use 
different actors make of electricity and their access to storage. For example, hot water 
tanks or well insulated buildings provide thermal storage that is much cheaper than an 
equivalent energy capacity provided by a battery. 
 
7KHPRUHH[WHQVLYHXVHRIFRUUHFWLYHDFWLRQVLVDUJXDEO\WKHHVVHQFHRID¶VPDUWHUJULG·
However, one word of caution should perhaps be introduced: there is always the 
possibility of a control action being delayed or not taking place at all. Although 
corrective actions promise to reduce average system operation costs and deliver, in the 
long term, similar reliability of supply to that which we experience now, the more 
reliance is placed on them, particularly on time critical actions, the more vulnerable the 
system might be expected to become to occasional quite large interruptions to supply. 
Although some technologists like to WDONDERXWD¶VPDUWJULG·EHLQJVPDUWWKURXJKXVH
RI¶LQWHOOLJHQW·GHYLFHVDFWXDOO\WKHFULWLFDOWKLQJWKDWQHHGVWREH¶VPDUW·LVWKHGHVLJQHU
of the system and its component parts. This, in turn, places an emphasis on the 
recruitment and training of talented engineers into the power sector that, in our view, is 
insufficiently widely recognised3. 
Significant network reinforcement almost certainly required 
$VDILQDODQGZHEHOLHYHYHU\LPSRUWDQWREVHUYDWLRQRQZKDWD¶ORZFDUERQQHWZRUN·
might look likHZHQRWHWKDWZKDWHYHUWKHEHQHILWVRID¶VPDUWHU·JULGSURJUHVVLYH
decarbonisation of the electricity system will, without doubt, still require significant 
LQYHVWPHQWLQ¶SULPDU\·DVVHWVLHWKRVHWKDWJHQHUDWHWUDQVPLWRUGLVWULEXWHSRZHU$W
the very least, they will be needed to connect new low carbon sources of power to the 
WUDQVPLVVLRQV\VWHP$OWKRXJK¶VPDUWHU·RSHUDWLRQRXJKWWRUHGXFHWKHH[WHQWRIQHHG
for deeper reinforcements, we are aware of no transmission studies at a GB or European 
scale that credibly suggest they can be avoided in the next 10-20 years and beyond. 
Indeed, the European Ten Year Network Development Plan suggests a requirement for 
major investment in that timeframe4; beyond that, various studies, albeit conducted at a 
very high level and inevitably dependent on a range of assumptions, suggest a need for 
                                               
3 For further discussion, see, for example, Keith Bell´0HWKRGVDQG7RROVIRU3ODQQLQJWKH)XWXUH
3RZHU6\VWHP,VVXHVDQG3ULRULWLHVµ$XJXVWDYDLODEOH
http://www.theiet.org/sectors/energy/resources/modelling-reports/papers.cfm  
4 The Ten Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) is produced through the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) every two years. The most recent edition 
can be found here: https://www.entsoe.eu/major-projects/ten-year-network-development-
plan/tyndp-2014/Pages/default.aspx   
massive further investment5. These developments  will present major delivery challenges 
in respect of planning permissions, supply chain and skills; if they are not delivered, 
WKH\ZLOOSUHVHQWDPDMRUWKUHDWWRGHHSGHFDUERQLVDWLRQRI(XURSH·VSURGXFWLRQDQGXVH
of energy. However, while it is true that extra network capacity can allow imbalances 
between demand and the available low carbon power to be shared out spatially and so 
reduce the need for curtailment of renewables, it has also been observed that enhanced 
transmission network capacity does not, by itself, guarantee reduction of carbon 
emissions in the shorter term. This is also dependent on the relative position in the 
¶PHULWRUGHU·RIJDV-fired and coal- or lignite-fired generation. (Extra transmission 
capacity might simply allow cheap coal and lignite in the East of Europe to displace more 
expensive combined cycle gas turbine plant in the West)6. Furthermore, lack of 
transmission investment would also hinder European Commission ambitions towards a 
fully integrated and transparent European electricity market and the associated total 
European social welfare benefits. 
 
At a distribution level, it is not uncommon at present for the connection of low carbon 
JHQHUDWLRQWREHSUHYHQWHGGXHWRODFNRIWKHH[LVWLQJQHWZRUN·VDELOLW\WRDFFRPPRGDWH
it. In recent months, this has particularly been the case in respect of solar PV in the 
south of Britain. Some form of distribution network reinforcement is likely to be 
required but, as we discuss in section 5, we are not persuaded that current regulatory 
and commercial arrangements concerning distribution network operators are adequate 
to incentivise the accommodation of distributed generation at least total system cost. In 
addition, we are not aware of any extensive studies undertaken to assess the likely total 
cost of distribution network development to facilitate various low carbon futures, some 
of which might involve significant electrification of heat and vehicle transport7. 
                                               
5 See, for example, Pudjianto, et al, "Asymmetric impacts of European transmission network 
development towards 2050: Stakeholder assessment based on IRENE-40 scenarios." Energy 
Economics, 2014. 
6 See Keith Bell, Tom Houghton, et al´7HFKQLFDODQGHFRQRPLFLPSDFWDQDO\VLVRIWKH
demonstrations in TF2 ² Deliverable: D15.µ:3(FRQRPLFLPSDFWVRIWKHGHPRQVWUDWLRQV
barriers towards scaling up and solutions, TWENTIES project, 2014, available 
http://www.twenties-project.eu/node/18  
7 A study commissioned in late 2014 by the Energy Networks Association (ENA) ² ´'LVWULEXWLRQ
6\VWHPµ² had quite ambitious initial terms of reference and has sought to quantify the 
benefits likely to accrue from various smarter ways of operating distributions networks ² see 
http://www.smarternetworks.org/Project.aspx?ProjectID=1589 . However, in our opinion, 
insufficient time or resource was made available for the study for there to be any expectation of it 
producing any strong conclusions beyond the relative attractiveness of a limited number of 
network technologies. 
4 How can we ensure that a low carbon network 
is designed and operated fairly and in a way 
that helps to minimise consumer bills?   
Institutional issues 
Without major institutional change, delivery of good design, fair operation and minimal 
cost of a low carbon network depend on present day power industry actors. In our view, 
some of the key institutional issues affecting them include the following. 
 
x More innovation on the part of energy retailers. The number of relatively large 
users of electrical energy who are ready to be flexible in the timing of their 
consumption is increasing. Their interactions with existing reserve markets are 
often facilitated by aggregators and are proving increasingly valuable to the 
electricity transmission system operator, National Grid. However, to more fully 
unlock the benefits of flexible demand, the participation of many more users is 
required, and this arguably needs much more innovation on the part of energy 
retailers/suppliers in respect of products and prices. 
x Better sharing of information0DQ\RIWKH¶VPDUWHU·DFWLRQVWKDWFDQPRUHIXOO\
utilise low carbon generation should take place on the distribution networks. 
Some of these would increase utilisation of the distribution network 
infrastructure but require distribution network operators (DNOs) to have better 
visibility than now of what is happening on their system and what might happen. 
Other actions that take place at a distribution level will benefit the whole system. 
If DNOs are to continue to be responsible for operating their systems, this 
depends on adequate sharing of information and coordination between 
distribution and transmission and between different transmission licensees. 
x Better understanding of risk. As already noted, reduction of operational margins 
and greater dependency on corrective actions is likely to increase the probability 
that some corrective actions will fail and would lead to greater exposure to 
disconnections of demand or, on the transmission system, of widespread 
blackouts; however, the latter incidents, while having a high impact, are very rare 
and, if system monitoring and control is designed and implemented well, will 
continue to be rare. Moreover, back-XS¶GHIHQFH·V\VWHPVFDQOLPLWWKHLPSDFWif 
and when they occur. 
x Continued support for network innovation. This is discussed in section 6. 
¶6PDUW·PHWHUV 
One means by which network operators might improve their visibility of all parts of a 
network and have access to services offered by a multiplicity of actors, including small 
generators and consumers, is arguably the so-FDOOHG¶VPDUWPHWHU·7KLVSURPLVHV
automated real-time information on power, not just a retrospective manually collected 
measure of total energy consumed within a period with no indication of when it was 
consumed. The UK Government plans a roll-RXWRI¶VPDUWPHWHUV·DFURVVWKHZKROHRI
Britain in the next few years8. However, the realisation of the potential depends on the 
VSHFLILFDWLRQRIWKH¶VPDUWPHWHUV·2XUXQGHUVWDQGLQJLVthat, while readings will indeed 
be collected automatically (and should, for example, facilitate easier switching of 
suppliers), they will collect energy measurements accumulated over half-hour periods9. 
In common with large, half-hourly metered consumers at present, this would allow 
some degree of time of use pricing which can be used to incentivise consumption at 
different times. However, it would not, on its own, allow monitoring and compensation 
for actions that balance out within a half-hour period. That is, a reduction of demand 
that then increases, say, 10 or 20 minutes later, such as might be the case for 
refrigeration load, would not be seen and would therefore not be remunerated. In 
addition, for management of their own networks, DNOs would like to see measurements 
or power and voltage at least every few minutes; however, we understand that the GB 
¶VPDUWPHWHU·VSHFLILFDWLRQGRHVQRWLQFOXGHPHDVXUHPHQWRIYROWDJH10. Moreover, we 
DOVRXQGHUVWDQGWKDWWKHGDWDFROOHFWHGIURPWKHVWDQGDUG¶VPDUWPHWHU· will be owned 
by suppliers11. It would be easy to speculate that they would want to maximise the value 
of their data by making it available to others only at a price. 
 
One benefit of automated meter reading should be that customers can switch suppliers 
more readily and with greater confidence that bills will reconciled correctly. This ought 
to lead to keener competition in the retail sector. One additional thing that we believe 
should face as few obstacles as possible is the scope for innovation in respect of 
JHQXLQH¶VPDUWQHVV·%HFDXVHWKHFRVWRIUHSODFLQJPHWHUVLVVRKLJKWKHPDMRULW\RIWKH
                                               
8 Policy in Northern Ireland is as in the rest of the UK but implementation has been delegated to 
the Northern Ireland Assembly with the Minister for Energy in the province declaring in 2012 that 
all homes will have them by 2020. However, in practice, our understanding is that only trials have 
taken place. NIE is still consulting and no costs have yet been included in their price control which 
runs tR&XUUHQWPHWHUUHSODFHPHQWVDUHVWLOOEHLQJFRQGXFWHGRQD¶QRQ-VPDUW·EDVLV 
9 6HHSRIWKHGUDIW¶VPDUWPHWHU·VSHFLILFDWLRQ
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/381535/SMIP_E
2E_SMETS2.pdf  
10 7KHGUDIW¶VPDUWPHWHU·VSHFLILFDWLRQUHTXLUHVPHDVXUHPHQWRIDFWLYHSRZHUH[SRUWDQGUHDFWLYH
power import/export but not voltage. 
11 Data access and privacy issues are discussed here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/43046/7225-
gov-resp-sm-data-access-privacy.pdf  
cost is for safe installation, not for the meter itself), we believe it is unrealistic for this to 
EHEXLOWLQWRWKHVHFXUHPHWHU¶KDUG-ZLUHG·LQWRDQHOHFWULFLW\XVHU·VHOHFWULFLW\VXSSO\
Instead, the market should be encouraged to develop devices that can be safely 
augmented to installed equipment and incorporate as many features as customers 
choose to have12.  
Reliability of supply 
One question that is fundamental to delivery of what electricity users want at least cost 
is: wKDWLVDQ¶DFFHSWDEOH· level of reliability of supply? As discussed above, a key feature 
RID¶VPDUWHU·JULGZRXOGVHHPWREHIOH[LEOHGHPDQG7KDWZRXOGUHTXLUHXVWR 
GLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQ¶VRIW·LQWHUUXSWLRQVDFWXDOO\MXVWUHGXFWLRQVQRWFRPSOHWH
LQWHUUXSWLRQVDQGDXWKRULVHGXQGHUFRQWUDFWDQG¶KDUG·LQWHUUXSWLRQVFRPSOHWH
disconnection, not intended but not 100% avoidable). Otherwise, it seems unlikely that 
society would accept a reduction in reliability. However, it may also be speculated that 
many electricity users and their political representatives are unaware of what reliability 
of supply they can expect now and what the major causes of interruptions are.  
Further institutional issues are discussed in the next section. 
5 How can we ensure that grid connections are 
readily accessible across the country and that 
costs are fair?  
Transmission connections 
$UJXDEO\LWLVDOUHDG\WKHFDVHWKDWWUDQVPLVVLRQFRQQHFWLRQVDUH¶UHDGLO\DFFHVVLEOH·
DQGFRVWVDUH¶IDLU·7KHWUDQVPLVVLRQV\VWHPRSHUDWRULQOLDLVRQZLWKWKHUHOHYDQW
transmission owner, is obliged to make an offer of a connection to the transmission 
system within 3 months of receipt of a valid application and the cost of making an 
application is regulated13,QDGGLWLRQORFDOFRQQHFWLRQZRUNVDUH¶FRQWHVWDEOH·LHWKH
applicant is not forced to buy the service from the incumbent transmission owner. 
However, there is no guarantee that an offer will be for an immediate connection or that 
the connection, when it is made, will be cheap.  Delays can occur (a) for planning 
FRQVHQWVIRUORFDOFRQQHFWLRQVRUEIRU¶GHHSHU·UHLQIRUFHPHQWVWREHLGHQWLILHG
approved, implemented (the last of these also dependent on planning as well as 
manufacture, construction and commissioning) and paid for.  
                                               
12 For further discussion, see http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/news/smart-meters-and-untidy-thinking-
a-blog-from-ukerc-co-director-keith-bell.html  
13 See http://www2.nationalgrid.com/uk/services/electricity-connections/new-connection/  
7KH¶6HFXULW\DQG4XDOLW\RI6XSSO\6WDQGDUG·646614) provides a common, published 
basis for determining what features are required of a transmission connection and 
deeper reinforcements, and hence their costs and delivery timescales. Data exchange 
rules and the technical performance required of, in particular, generators connecting to 
the transmission system are documented in The Grid Code (which is publicly 
accessible15). 
 
7KHFRVWVRIWKH¶GHHSHU·WUDQVPission system, i.e. the main, shared infrastructure, are 
recovered via the Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charge16. The basis for 
the way in which it is calculated for different users has been the subject of a review by 
Ofgem in recent years ² ¶3URMHFW7UDQVPL7·17 ² and has led to approval of a change 
argued to better recognise the different drivers for transmission expansion arising from 
different patterns of use of the system by different generators18. One effect of that has 
been to reduce the charges levied on wind farms in the locations that are most remote 
from the main demand centres while still allowing demand in the remoter areas to pay 
less than demand in the biggest centres19. It is our understanding that, while many 
transmission users would not regard the new approach as perfect, most would regard it 
as fairer than the previous one. 
Distribution connections 
Inevitably, the generators or loads for which owners seek connections to a distribution 
network are smaller than those for which a transmission connection would be more 
suited and, as a consequence, the owners or developers may lack the resources ² 
people, money and expertise ² that are mustered behind bigger projects. It may 
therefore be argued that technical standards, however rationally set, represent a greater 
barrier than they would for transmission. We would argue that it certainly does not help 
that, in contrast to transmission, those standards are not published and must be bought 
at a significant fee from the Energy Networks Association20.  
 
                                               
14 See http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/Electricity-codes/System-
Security-and-Quality-of-Supply-Standards/  
15 See http://www2.nationalgrid.com/uk/industry-information/electricity-codes/grid-code/the-
grid-code/  
16 See http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/System-charges/Electricity-
transmission/Transmission-network-use-of-system-charges/  
17 See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/transmission-networks/charging/project-transmit  
18 For discussion, see https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/academic-review-
transmission-charging-arrangements-universities-strathclyde-and-birmingham  
19 Scotland is an example of a location where generation side users of the transmission system 
tend to pay higher TNUoS charges than in most other areas but demand side users pay less. 
20 See http://www.energynetworks.org/electricity/engineering/engineering-
documents/engineering-documents-overview.html  
Historically, where network capacity has been judged by a DNO to be insufficient to 
accommodate a new connection without breach of network limits at any time, the DNO 
has required reinforcements to be done as a precondition of connection with those 
reinforcements paid in large part by the connecting party21 and the specification such 
that the operation of the connected equipment does not need to be monitored, i.e. the 
'12FDQ¶ILWDQGIRUJHW·WKHFRQQHFWLRQ 
 
7KHWHQGHQF\IRU¶ILWDQGIRUJHW·FRQQection of generation embedded within the 
distribution networks22 is a reflection of the relative lack of observability and 
controllability on the present day distribution networks and is only now being slowly 
changed to recognise that network limits only become binding ² and, hence require 
action on the part of the operator, or, in the longer term, the network developer ² at 
certain times. It is our view that active management of distribution networks will often 
provide a more cost-effective solution to the accommodation of new generation than 
WKHQHWZRUNUHLQIRUFHPHQWVWKDW¶ILWDQGIRUJHW·ZRXOGHQWDLO+RZHYHUZHEHOLHYHWKDW
the current immaturity of commercial frameworks around distribution connection and 
operation not only of generation but also of flexible demand and inconsistency between 
DNOs hinders the discovery of economic solutions and fair treatment of all network 
users or potential users. One outcome is that large costs, significant risks or both are 
placed on generation developers often with the result that developments do not go 
DKHDG)URPDZKROHHQHUJ\V\VWHPSRLQWRIYLHZWKLVPLJKWRQRFFDVLRQVEHWKH¶ULJKW·
outcome in respect of a development at a particular location provided other more 
economic locations are developed. However, if an increase in embedded generation 
capacity as a whole is not to be held back, there is in our view a need for clear and 
consistent commercial frameworks that adequately reveal the costs and benefits of 
network reinforcements and active distribution network management and share risks 
and rewards between parties connected to the network and the DNO. 
 
In saying the above, it should be recognised that DNOs have been subject to many years 
of price control by Ofgem and its predecessor that have had the effect of driving down 
DNO costs. A DNO might argue that more active network management and more 
considered processing of connection applications are new duties that have not been 
provided for in their remuneration arrangements. On the other hand, Ofgem might 
argue that DNOs have been free rein to make arguments for extra allowances to which 
Ofgem would give due consideration. 
                                               
21 See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/distribution-networks/charging-arrangements  
22 *HQHUDWLRQHPEHGGHGZLWKDGLVWULEXWLRQQHWZRUNLVDOVRNQRZQDV¶GLVWULEXWHGJHQHUDWLRQ·
(DG). 
6 What are the key technologies available today 
and how effectively do Government and 
Ofgem incentivise innovation and 
development of the grid and grid 
technologies?   
Grid development incentives 
In section 3, we expressed the view that a future low carbon network is likely to depend 
RQLQYHVWPHQWLQ¶SULPDU\·DVVHWV² those that that generate, transmit or distribute 
power. However, it has been argXHGE\VRPHWKDWLQFHQWLYHVWRZDUGV¶GHYHORSPHQWRI
WKHJULG·DUHWRRVWURQJ23. This is predicated on the idea that, because the regulated 
network licensees gain an income proportional to the value of their asset base, they will 
naturally seek to increase that asset base by identifying needs for reinforcement that 
PLJKWQRWUHDOO\EHWKHUHRU¶JROGSODWLQJ·WKHQHWZRUN+RZHYHULWLVDOVRWKHFDVHWKDW
asset values are only added to the regulated asset base if Ofgem deems them to have 
been legitimately incurred in accordance with the network licences, a key condition of 
ZKLFKLVDQ¶HFRQRPLFDQGHIILFLHQW·QHWZRUN0RUHRYHUWKHFDSLWDOWRIXQGLQYHVWPHQWV
still needs to be raised and the majority of income is generally only reset at the end of a 
price control period (which used to be 5 years and is now 8 years); thus, it may be 
supposed that the network licensees prefer not to incur capital expenditure at the 
beginning of a price control period. On the other hand, given constraints in the supply 
chain and incentives on a system operator to reduce the number and duration of 
construction outages, excessive delay may prevent projects from being delivered before 
they should be and so risk non-compliance with the licence in the direction of apparent 
under-investment. 
Key technologies 
A number of key technologies that might permit increased utilisation of the electricity 
system infrastructure have been mentioned in section 3, e.g. real-time ratings and 
associated forecasting; power electronics and HVDC, notably more advanced control and 
higher ratings for transmission applications and lower costs for distribution 
applications; phase shifting transformers, series compensation and their coordinated 
                                               
23 6HH,PSHULDO&ROOHJH/RQGRQDQG8QLYHUVLW\RI&DPEULGJH´,QWHJUDWHG7UDQVPission Planning 
DQG5HJXODWLRQ3URMHFW5HYLHZRI6\VWHP3ODQQLQJDQG'HOLYHU\µDYDLODEOHKHUH
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/integrated-transmission-planning-and-
regulation-project-emerging-thinking  
use; and phasor measurement units. To these might be added increased current and 
voltage ratings for underground or undersea cables; less visually intrusive but not 
H[FHVVLYHO\FRVWO\GHVLJQVRIWRZHUVIRURYHUKHDGOLQHVUHOLDEOH¶SOXJDQGSOD\·VSHFLDO
protection schemes or active network management; automatic generation control; 
integrated monitoring, protection, remote control and data collection for distribution 
networks; integrated condition monitoring and communication; fault current limiters; 
and cheaper forms of energy storage capable of converting into electricity. However, the 
required technologies also include new software tools to manage data, model system 
performance and provide decision support to system operators24. 
Innovation incentives 
It has been documented that, in the years following liberalisation of the electricity 
VXSSO\LQGXVWU\LQ%ULWDLQWKHLQGXVWU\·VH[SHQGLWXUHRQUHVHDUFKDQGGHYHORSPHQW
decline dramatically, particularly in the distribution sector25. Since then, Ofgem has 
introduced a number of schemes designed to encourage the network licensees ² 
electricity and gas, transmission and distribution ² to innovate and to be free to use a 
FHUWDLQDPRXQWRIFXVWRPHUV·PRQH\WRGRVRSURYLGHGFHUWDLQFRQGLWLRQVDUHPHW26. We 
believe Ofgem is to be highly commended for this initiative manifested through the 
Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI), the Low Carbon Networks Fund (LCNF), the Network 
Innovation Allowance (NIA) and the Network Innovation Competition (NIC). The success 
of these schemes can be seen through the increased investment in innovation. However, 
 
x in our view, they have not always been used as effectively as they could be; 
x we understand that they are now under threat. 
*LYHQWKHOLFHQFHFRQGLWLRQWRZDUGV¶HFRQRPLFDQGHIILFLHQW·QHWZRUNVYDULRXVLQFRPH
adjustors introduced by Ofgem under the new R,,2UHJLPHWRUHZDUG¶JRRG·
performance and the promise offered by the various technologies mentioned above, it 
might asked why the network licensees need any innovation incentives. Indeed, that is 
OLNHO\WREHEHKLQGZKDWZHXQGHUVWDQGWREH2IJHP·VYLHZthat the current explicit 
innovation incentives ² not only NIC but also NIA27 ² can be stopped with no detrimental 
effect for consumers. Leaving aside the particular features of NIA and NIC, as a general 
principle, we believe that would be a mistake. 
                                               
24 See http://www.theiet.org/sectors/energy/resources/modelling-reports/index.cfm  
25 6HHIRUH[DPSOH7RRUDM-DPDVE0LFKDHO*3ROOLWW´:K\DQGKRZWRVXEVLGLVHHQHUJ\5'
/HVVRQVIURPWKHFROODSVHDQGUHFRYHU\RIHOHFWULFLW\LQQRYDWLRQLQWKH8.µEnergy Policy, Volume 
83, August 2015, Pages 197-205 
26 See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/network-regulation-riio-model/network-innovation  
27 The Network Innovation Competition (NIC) differs from the Network Innovation Allowance (NIA) 
in that, in NIC, funds are awarded to large projects through a competitive process are aimed at 
WHFKQRORJLHVZLWKTXLWHKLJK¶WHFKQRORJ\UHDGLQHVVOHYHOV·75/V 
7KH¶HFRQRPLFDQGHIILFLHQW·OLFHQFHFRQGLWLRQKDVEHHQLQSODFHVLQFHOLEHUDOLVDWLRQ
Why, then, was it necessary to introduce IFI, LCNF, NIA and NIC? In our view, the answer 
concerns risk and uncertainty. 
 
For the most part, the network licensees are seen by their shareholders, i.e.  by 
investors, as low risk investments with unspectacular but safe returns. They are not 
exposed to competitive markets (except insofar as Ofgem seeks to compare one 
OLFHQVHHZLWKDQRWKHULQSULFHUHYLHZVDQGWRUHZDUG¶JRRG·SHUIRUPHUVDQGSXQLVK¶EDG·
ones); their income is largely fixed and well-known quite far in advance. However, their 
scope for making very large profits through some kind of competitive advantage is 
limited. In the past, it has also tended to be that their scope for increasing profit 
through cost reduction was limited as Ofgem, acting in way that it saw as best for 
consumers, tended to take a large part of that cost reduction at the next price control as 
SDUWRIWKH¶EDVHOLQH·LHWRJLYHPXFKRIWKHEHQHILWWo consumers (meaning less 
benefit for shareholders). 
 
One feature of any innovation is that, by definition, it is new. Because it is new, it is 
unfamiliar and, hence, there seems to be a chance that it will not work as expected, will 
save less money than expected or cost more than expected. In other words, there is risk 
and uncertainty.  
 
:RXOGWKHQHWZRUNOLFHQVHHV·LQYHVWRUVZHOFRPHWKHOLFHQVHHVEHFRPLQJELJJHUULVN
takers? Would, in the end, Ofgem welcome it? At the extreme, some innovation might 
lead to some unreliability of supply or failure to facilitate competition in the electricity 
PDUNHW¶6HFXULW\RIVXSSO\·DQGIDFLOLWDWLRQRIWKHPDUNHWDUHDOVRQHWZRUNOLFHQFH
conditions). Even if that does not happen, a market perception of risk would lead to an 
LQFUHDVHLQWKHOLFHQVHHV·FRVWRIERUURZLQJDQGDVDFRQVHTXHQFHWKHFRVWRIQHWZRUN
investments increasing. 
 
In our view, where IFI, LCNF, NIA and NIC have been successful has been in giving the 
licensees scope to address uncertainty, to explore an idea and gain knowledge about it 
before committing to it fully; in other words, to undertake research and development 
5	'WKDWWKHFRPSDQLHV·UHVSRQVHWRWKHUHJXODWRU\UHJLPH² the squeezing 
downwards of costs ² would not otherwise entertain. If done well, the R&D would be of 
long term benefit to consumers as innovations could be identified in which there can be 
confidence, not least with respect to delivering the core service at least cost.  
Where, in our view, the innovation schemes have not been done well has been due, in 
particular, to the following: 
 
a) 7KHOLFHQVHHVKDYHLQWHUSUHWHG¶VXFFHVV·RIDQLQQRYDWLRQSURMHFWDVRQO\DULVLQJ
if the idea being investigated is adopted as business as usual. This has the 
result, firstly, that projects are commissioned only if they are judged to have a 
KLJKFKDQFHRI¶VXFFHVV·LQZKLFKFDVHWKHUHZRXOGVHHPWREHUHODWLYHO\OLWWOH
doubt about the outcome and one wonders why innovation allowance money ² 
designed to account for risk and uncertainty ² was needed; and, secondly, 
negative or inconclusive results can tend to be hidden even when they are quite 
XQGHUVWDQGDEOHDQGFRQWDLQLPSRUWDQWOHDUQLQJ,QVWHDGLQRXUYLHZ¶VXFFHVV·
should concern the quality of the evidence gained either that it should be 
adopted (and how) or that it should not (if certain conditions are not met). This 
implies that a robust, informed judgement regarding the proposed innovation 
can now be made. 
b) The network licensees have, over the last 25 years, broadly forgotten how to do, 
manage or report R&D with the result that experiments are not always well 
designed and reports sometimes fail to provide the means by which others might 
test the results and conclusions.28 
c) A failure to recognise that uncertainty is not just something that prevents 
exploitation of an opportunity but might instead concern a threat that is not well 
understood. An example of the former might be real-time thermal ratings: how 
do we do it, what does it cost, what are the risks, what are the benefits? An 
example of the latteULVWKHSXEOLF·VSHUFHSWLRQRIHOHFWURPDJQHWLFILHOGV7KHUH
is no clear, consistent evidence of a detrimental effect on health but some 
people believe there is, nonetheless, a detrimental effect. There is clearly a need 
to keep investigating, but who pays for it? Other examples are: the possibility 
that a power system with too little inertia will be inoperable ² we do not yet know 
if that is true or how little inertia is too little; and, what would be impact of use 
of SF6 gas being banned29? 
Government support for innovation 
In addition to the support for innovation made available through Ofgem, the UK 
Government plays an important role. In respect of taking technologies through to 
demonstration and deployment, initiatives through The Carbon Trust and InnovateUK 
are significant. However, more basic research and development tends to be funded 
                                               
28 We believe there is now evidence that at least some network licensees are becoming better at 
managing and reporting R&D. The quality of published outputs has improved through the lifespan 
of the LCNF.  
29 Sulphur hexafluoride ² SF6 ² is an excellent electrical insulator widely used in power system 
switchgear to aid the extinction of arcs created by the isolation of short circuit faults, and 
increasingly used in compact high voltage substations. It is also an extremely potent greenhouse 
gas. 
through the research councils, in particular the Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC), and undertaken at universities. The European Commission 
also plays an important part in supporting research, development and demonstration 
although UK industry and academic actors arguably take less advantage of this than they 
could. 
 
Universities in the UK can play a key role in helping the power companies transition to 
the new, low carbon world, delivering both ideas and people to the energy industry. This 
requires not only individual academics who meet standard university performance 
metrics by churning out learned papers but teams that are capable of helping industry 
navigate the challenges facing them, resolve key uncertainties and adopt appropriate 
innovations. This requires considerable investment of time and effort in close industry 
engagement and support for building and retaining capacity, not least in terms of 
expert research personnel. However, the insistence by Ofgem that NIA and NIC are 
SURMHFWVSHFLILF(365&·VVKRUW-term funding of more basic research through individual 
SURMHFWVDQG(365&·VRIWHQXQUHOLDEOHUHYLHZSURFHVVPDNHWKLVFKDOOHQJLQJ 
7 What impact will changes to the electricity 
system have on the role of National Grid and 
the Distribution Network Operators?  
System operation 
Because a power system is a single, dynamic, non-linear system in which a condition 
can be tipped into instability within moments and a system collapse take place within 
seconds, we find it difficult to envisage the GB system being operated more effectively 
by multiple system operators than by one. However, as it does now, successful system 
operation depends on successful interaction between different parties. At present, that 
primarily means large generators providing ancillary services, procured by National Grid. 
In future, it should involve many more providers including flexible demand. Given the 
location of many of those future active participants, an extended role for DNOs seems 
essential. Although aggregators might interact with electricity users and organise the 
availability of responses or re-scheduled consumption in order to contribute to 
balancing of the system as a whole, distribution network limits still need to be 
respected. One way in which possible conflicts between required whole system actions 
and those required on a local network might be avoided would be through a hierarchical 
control in which procurement of margin and actuation of responses from actors within a 
given distribution network area are the responsibility of the DNO which then operates as 
D¶GLVWULEXWLRQsystem RSHUDWRU·7KHFULWLFDOGLPHQVLRQLQWKLVZLOOEHWKHFRUUHFW
management of the electrical interface between different levels of the hierarchy, e.g. 
between transmission and distribution, with definition, in real time, of the prevailing and 
expected power transfer and the margin for increases and decreases, all quantified by 
the operator of the lower level knowing what is active on its own network. Although at 
least one LCNF project has begun to explore some of these ideas30'12V·FXOWXUHDQG
expertise would need to change significantly before the vision can be realised. (See 
section 5 for further discussion of DNOs). As now, the interactions between different 
items of equipment owned by different parties are likely to depend on appropriate 
technical standards31. 
System planning and development 
In respect of planning and development of the system, changes are already afoot. 
Purchase of long-term services by a single buyer from generators has recently been 
introduced with two auction mechanisms: one for energy from low carbon sources, the 
other for generation capacity available at times of peak demand. Now, as part of 
¶,QWHJUDWHG7UDQVPLVVLRQ3ODQQLQJDQG5HJXODWLRQ·,7352IJHPLVVHHNLQJWRLQWURGXFH
the idea, in effect, of the single GB transmission system operator buying significant 
instances of new transmission network capacity through a tendering process (as distinct 
from the regional transmission owners deciding on additional capacity, designing it and 
then buying the equipment for it and the construction of it through a tendering 
process)32. How this works and whether it will really bring efficiencies remains to be 
VHHQ,WPD\EHQRWHGWKDW2IJHP·VLQLWLDWLYHGRHVQRWH[WHQGWRFRRUGLQDWLRQRIQHWZRUN
investment between transmission and distribution, aspects of which are: whether the 
market signals, not least use of system charges, correctly incentivise generators to 
connect to transmission or distribution; whether the network design standards that 
apply to 132kV in Scotland are appropriate; and what impacts aggregated, individually 
relatively small changes to demand and generation on the distribution network might 
have on transmission and where those impacts would best be managed. 
 
                                               
30 6HHRXWSXWVWRGDWHIURPWKH¶$FFHOHUDWLQJ5HQHZDEOH&RQQHFWLRQV·$5&SURMHFWHJKHUH
http://www.spenergynetworks.co.uk/pages/arc_accelerating_renewable_connections.asp , and 
proposals for a follow-on project based on ideas from the University of Strathclyde¶(YROXWLRQ·
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/network-regulation-riio-model/network-innovation/electricity-
network-innovation-competition  
31 The IET has suggested that increasingly rapid changes to the technologies connected to the 
power system will make it difficult to ensure that standards are updated appropriately and remain 
fit for purpose. They have proposed that a new role of ¶V\VWHPDUFKLWHFW·ZRXOGKDYHUHVSRQVLELOLW\
for ensuring alignment of standards. See http://www.theiet.org/factfiles/energy/brit-power-
page.cfm  
32 See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/transmission-networks/integrated-transmission-
planning-and-regulation  
Competition in provision of services 
Ofgem has long regarded it as important to extend the role of competition in the 
HOHFWULFLW\V\VWHP,WKDVIDYRXUHG¶PHUFKDQW·GHYHORSPHQWRILQWHUFRQQHFWLRQFDSDFLW\
where private investors both identify a need or opportunity for capacity and deliver it. 
However, such an approach tends to under-deliver capacity relative to the theoretical 
socio-economic optimum. (When capacity is scarce, risk is limited for the investor and 
LQFRPHPD[LPLVHG3DUWO\IRUWKLVUHDVRQPDQ\RI2IJHP·V(XURSHDQFRXQWHUSDUWV
favour development by a regulated transmission system operator (TSO). 
 
Given that the function of an interconnector can be seen as the spatial redistribution of 
imbalances between generation and demand, an analogy can be seen with storage. 
Pumped storage facilities, capable of converting both to and from electricity, were 
originally seen, alongside network capacity, as services to be developed and used by a 
TSO. However, in the 1990s, Ofgem required divestment of pumped storage capacity by 
National Grid. To an extent, the separation of transmission ownership (TO) from system 
operation (SO) could be seen in the same light. One outcome of such a separation could 
be argued to be that the system operator will now lack full information on the costs and 
benefits of the full range of options ² including network expansion ² to manage the 
system in the medium to long term. Following a split of TO from SO alongside the 
established separation of generation from network ownership and operation, if the 
system operator is to procure appropriate services correctly, even if they are offered as 
different products, it should be possible for the SO to consider providers in light of all 
the services they are offering and not each service in isolation. For example, a particular 
generator might seem expensive in respect of capacity in the capacity market alone, but 
a capacity contract might be efficient given (a) the frequency service that the generator 
offers and (b) the way its operation would avoid a need for network reinforcement 
(which would depend on a TO)33. 
8 What lessons can be learnt from low carbon 
electricity grids from other countries?   
Other countries in Europe are arguably much further down the road to decarbonisation 
of their electricity systems than Britain. These include: 
 
x France, with most of its electrical energy coming from nuclear and hydro power; 
x Spain, with a high penetration of wind and solar power; 
                                               
33 At least in respect of the various services that a generator might offer, one simple step might 
be to align the tendering timetables for different services so that they can be considered together. 
x Denmark, with a longstanding, planned commitment to decarbonisation of the 
whole energy system, not only electricity, significant experience of combined 
heat and power and district heating as well as wind, and of different funding 
mechanisms; 
x WKHLVODQGRI,UHODQGOLNH%ULWDLQDUHODWLYHO\VPDOOSRZHUV\VWHP¶V\QFKURQRXV
DUHD·EXWZLWKSURSRUWLRQDOO\PXFKPRUHZLQGJHQHUDWLRQWKDQ%ULWDLQ 
In France, although the electricity system is part of the single, European synchronous 
area and so experiences less variability of system frequency than we do in Britain and is 
well connected electrically with its neighbours, imbalances of power do still need to be 
managed. It has access to significant and highly flexible hydro resources but also 
requires at least some of its nuclear capacity to be capable of flexing its output. There is 
also significant electric heating load and this contributes to system balancing through a 
long-established, centrally managed load switching scheme. In addition, somewhat in 
contrast to the network licensees in Britain, the transmission system operator, RTE, has 
made it a priority to retain research and development and advanced analytical skills 
within the company. 
 
In Spain, although, like France, a part of the European synchronous area, there is very 
limited interconnection to the rest of the continent meaning that potential power 
imbalances arising from variability of wind and solar power and demand need to be 
carefully managed. To that end, a few years ago the Spanish system operator, REE, 
established a dedicated control centre for the management of renewables, CECRE34. 
In Ireland, the system operator and the government seem to have been much more 
systematic in assessing the challenges and potential solutions associated with the 
operation of many wind turbines than we have in Britain and have sought the best 
consultants from around Europe to carry out studies and make recommendations35. 
They have then looked globally for appropriate new system management software tools. 
 
Outside Europe, the PJM regional transmission organisation in the Eastern United States 
is widely regarded as operating an exemplar market for flexible demand36. It has indeed 
attracted a large number of participants adding to a significant total volume of reserve 
made available to the system operator. However, it should also be noted that the 
initiative has not been without its problems, e.g. in the first rounds of some of the 
markets, promised responses not being delivered; being subject to a legal challenge; 
                                               
34 See http://www.ree.es/en/activities/operation-of-the-electricity-system/control-centre-
renewable-energies  
35 For further information on the accommodation of renewables in Ireland, see 
http://www.eirgrid.com/operations/ds3/  
36 See http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/demand-response.aspx  
and, more recently, a recognition that at least one of the products was inadequately 
defined to contribute to management of imbalance risks arising in the winter37. 
9 Conclusions 
This paper has discussed networks to facilitate use of energy from low carbon sources. 
$IXWXUH¶ORZFDUERQQHWZRUN·QHHGQRWFRQFHUQRQO\HOHFWULFLW\² meeting future energy 
needs in a manner compliant with a particular carbon budget must address the demands 
RIKHDWDQGWUDQVSRUWDVZHOODVHOHFWULFLW\+RZHYHUHOHFWULFLW\·VUROe is likely to be 
critical because of the flexibility of use of electricity, the options for its generation and 
its current cost-effectiveness as an energy vector relative to, for example, hydrogen. 
Although heat networks ² at present, little used in Britain ² may become important and 
technologies such as micro combined heat and power (CHP) promise efficiency benefits 
ZLWKRXWWRWDOO\HOLPLQDWLQJFDUERQHPLVVLRQVWRODUJHH[WHQWD¶ORZFDUERQQHWZRUN·
means an electricity network. 
 
%ULWDLQ·VH[LVWLQJHOHFWUicity system has been successful at managing potential 
imbalances between demand for power and the available generation, facilitating the 
electricity market and delivering what is broadly regarded as an acceptable level of 
reliability of supply. However, the variability and uncertainty of much renewable 
generation, the reduction of system inertia and, unless designed with extra, costly 
capability, the relative inflexibility of nuclear power and fossil fuelled plant with carbon 
capture and storage, will make system balancing more challenging in future. 
Low carbon generation, in large part, can be expected to connect at the geographical or 
electrical periphery of the existing system, e.g. wind and nuclear power in locations that 
are remote from population centres, and solar PV within the lower voltage distribution 
networks. The present day electricity networks were not designed for much, if any, 
additional generation at such locations.  
 
In order to both accommodate additional low carbon generation and facilitate European 
Commission ambitions for a transparent, integrated European electricity market, a need 
IRUDGGLWLRQDO¶SULPDU\·HOHFWULFLW\QHWZRUNDVVHWV² i.e. those that generate, transmit or 
distribute power ² is very unlikely to be avoidable. Extra network capacity allows power 
                                               
37 The main demand response product at the time gave the system operator to curtail demand 
only in summer. Given the high level of cooling demand in summer, it provides a useful service. 
However, it is also likely that curtailment of cooling in summer will be made more available to the 
system operator than curtailment of heating iQZLQWHU)RUIXUWKHUEDFNJURXQGRQ3-0·VGHPDQG
UHVSRQVHVFKHPHVVHHIRUH[DPSOH&UDLJ*OD]HU´'HPDQG5HVSRQVHLQ3-03DVW6XFFHVVHVDQG
WKH0XUN\/HJDO)XWXUHRI'HPDQG5HVSRQVHµ-XO\0HDQZKLOHLWVKRXOGDOVREHQRWHGWKDW
it may be easier and more socially acceptable to procure demand response to reduce summer 
cooling load than to reduce winter heating load. 
imbalances to be shared spatially and so promises to reduce curtailment of renewables. 
However, in the short term, if coal or lignite remain cheaper to burn for the generation 
of electricity than gas, the carbon reduction benefits of enhanced transmission network 
capacity might not be realised. 
 
It ought to be possible to reduce the extent of need for new primary system capacity 
WKURXJK¶VPDUWHU·V\VWHPRSHUDWLRQZKLFKGHSHQGVRQPRUHDFFXUDWHDQGZLGHU
reaching network monitoring thDQZHKDYHDWSUHVHQW$OWKRXJK¶FRUUHFWLYH·DFWLRQVWR
PDQDJHXQSODQQHGGLVWXUEDQFHVWRWKHV\VWHPDUHDOUHDG\ZLGHO\XVHG¶VPDUWHU·V\VWHP
operation also depends on their much more extensive use, particularly in order to 
exploit the potential benefits of flexible demand. Key technologies include real-time 
ratings and associated forecasting; power electronics and HVDC, notably more advanced 
control and higher ratings for transmission applications and lower costs for distribution 
applications. They also include new software tools to manage data, model system 
performance and provide decision support to system operators. 
  
¶6PDUWHU·V\VWHPRSHUDWLRQGHSHQGVFUXFLDOO\RQDGHTXDWHH[SHUWLVHZLWKLQWKH
industry. Moreover, we see a number of institutional issues, including: a need for 
greater innovation on the part of energy retailers (suppliers); better sharing of 
information, in particular between distribution network operators (DNOs) and 
transmission licensees and between transmission licensees; and a need for a better 
understanding of reliability of supply and what is acceptable with distinctions made 
EHWZHHQ¶VRIW·DQG¶KDUG·LQWHUUXSWLRQVDQGWKHULVNRIPDMRUHYHQWVDVDSRVVLEOH
FRQVHTXHQFHRI¶VPDUWHU·V\VWHPRSHUDWLRQ 
 
We feel there is a need for a clHDUHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDW¶VPDUWPHWHUV·PLJKWEHDQG
a more effective implementation than we understand to be currently planned, with 
JUHDWHUVFRSHIRULQQRYDWLRQLQUHVSHFWRIWKH¶VPDUWQHVV·RIGHYLFHVXVHGE\FRQVXPHUV 
We see there being scope for improvement in the facilitation of new connections to the 
electricity networks and regard the greatest scope for improvement as being in respect 
of connections to the distribution networks. In particular, we believe that arrangements 
should be developed thaWPRYH'12VDZD\IURP¶ILWDQGIRUJHW·DSSURDFKHVDQG
towards more active network management, and that provide a basis for rational 
comparison of network reinforcement and generation curtailment options in such a way 
that does not place all the risk on parties seeking to connect to the network, and shares 
costs fairly between different connectees. 
 
Given what we see as an unavoidable need for at least some network development to 
deliver a lower carbon energy system, we believe that caution should be exercised with 
respect to claims that grid development incentives are currently too strong. 
We foresee greater use of controls located on the distribution networks, both for 
management of distribution network limits and for operation of the power system as a 
wholH7KLVZRXOGUHTXLUH'12VWRDFWPRUHDV¶GLVWULEXWLRQsystem RSHUDWRUV·DQGD
significant change in their culture and levels of expertise but also requires adequate 
coordination between distribution and transmission. One option to achieve that would 
be through an operational hierarchy with clearly defined limits and capabilities at the 
boundaries between operational entities. 
 
We believe there is scope for rationalisation of the different rules, conventions and 
incentives relating to distribution and transmission in order to more consistently give 
the correct signals to generation developers with respect to appropriate locations for 
development and, to the network licensees, facilitation of connection. 
 
System operation depends on different services ² many RIWKHPUHIHUUHGWRDV¶DQFLOODU\·
services ² offered by generators and, potentially, users of electricity and owners of 
storage. While Britain currently has some relatively well-developed markets for these 
services, we believe that benefits might arise from their better alignment allowing a 
package of capabilities to be assessed in respect of their overall cost-effectiveness. 
In our view, the various network innovation schemes established by Ofgem have been 
very worthwhile. Although we believe that their implementation and the conduct of 
¶LQQRYDWLRQ·² in particular, research and development (R&D) and subsequent building on 
learning ² could be improved, we believe it would be a mistake, as we understand 
Ofgem to be considering, to withdraw explicit financial support for R&D led or 
commissioned by network licensees. Moreover, the Government needs to continue to 
support innovation and R&D, not least through the development and retention of 
FDSDFLW\DQGH[SHUWLVHLQWKH8.·VXQLYHUVLWLHV 
 
Finally, we believe that useful insights can be gained from the experiences of, in 
particular, the following countries: 
 
x France, with most of its electrical energy coming from nuclear and hydro power; 
x Spain, with a high penetration of wind and solar power; 
x Denmark, with a longstanding, planned commitment to decarbonisation of the 
whole energy system (not only electricity), significant experience of combined 
heat and power and district heating as well as wind, and of different funding 
mechanisms; 
x the island of Ireland, like Britain, having a relatively small power system 
¶V\QFKURQRXVDUHD·EXWZLWKSURSRUWLRQDOO\PXFKPRUHZLQGJHQHUDWLRQWKDQ
Britain. 
 
 Appendix: The ECC Select Committee Inquiry 
 
In September 2015, the House of Commons Select Committee on Energy and Climate 
&KDQJH(&&LQLWLDWHGDQLQTXLU\LQWR¶ORZFDUERQQHWZRUNs· with the aim of identifying 
´ZKDWFKDQJHVDUHUHTXLUHGIURPWRGD\·VHOHFWULFLW\LQIUDVWUXFWXUHWREXLOGDORZFDUERQ
flexible and fair networkµ$FFRUGLQJWKH&RPPLWWHH 
 
The UK electricity infrastructure is ageing and substantial investment will be 
required to upgrade the network (both transmission and distribution) to address 
today and tomorrow's energy system needs. As low carbon technologies and 
distributed energy play a greater role, the move towards a smarter, more 
localised and diverse system presents both challenges and opportunities.  
Ensuring this transition occurs in a cost-effective way while maintaining system 
security and stability is challenging, and the Government needs to ensure that 
policies allow proper planning, testing and investment to take place. It will 
require addressing all elements of the energy infrastructure, including those on 
the demand side of the meter, engaging with customers and addressing their 
needs.  
  
For furWKHUEDFNJURXQGRQWKH&RPPLWWHH·VLQTXLU\DQGZKHQWKH\DUHSXEOLVKHG
written responses, see http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-
z/commons-select/energy-and-climate-change-committee/inquiries/ 
 
